Untuk membaca terjemahan ke dalam Bahasa Indonesia (dengan Google Translate), silahkan klik di sini.
Mr. Carson: (00:00)
A national security threat to be monitored and investigated. In 2017, we
learned for the first time that the Department of defense had quietly
restarted a similar organization tracking what we now call Unidentified
Aerial Phenomena or UAPs. Last year, Congress rewrote the charter for
that organization now called the Airborne Object Identification and
Management. Synchronization Group or AOIMSG for short. Today, we will
bring that organization out of the shadows. This hearing and oversight
work has a simple idea at its core. Unidentified aerial phenomena are a
potential national security threat, and they need to be treated that
way. For too long the stigma associated with UAPs has gotten in the way
of good intelligence analysis, pilots avoided reporting or were laughed
at when they did. It’s true, but they are real. They need to be
investigated. And many threats they pose need to be mitigated.
Mr. Carson: (01:05)
Under Secretary Moultrie, Mr. Bray, thank you for coming today. First,
we need you to update us on the status of AOIMSG. The legislation
creating it was passed in December, the deadline for implementation is
fast approaching, but the group does not even have a name director. We
need to know sirs the status of the organization and the obstacle to
getting it up and running. Secondly, you have to convince the audience
today, and most especially our military and civilian aviators the
culture has changed. That those who report UAPs will be treated as
witnesses not as crooks. Thirdly, you need to show us, Congress, and the
American public whose imaginations you have captured, you are willing
to follow the facts where they lead. We fear sometimes that the DOD is
focused more on emphasizing what it can explain not investigating what
it can.
Mr. Carson: (02:10)
I’m looking for you to assure us today that all conclusions are on the
table. One final note, we are mindful today that AOIMSG is not starting
from scratch. This is the third version of this task force in DOD, and
civil society groups like the Mutual UFO Network, Mr. Corbell and others
have been collecting data on this issue for years. I hope you’ll
explain how you can leverage the knowledge and experience of our prior
work on this matter to move the AOIMSG along. The last time Congress had
a hearing on UAPs was half a century ago. I hope that it does not take
50 more years for Congress to hold another because transparency is
desperately needed. And now turn to ranking member Crawford for comments
he’d like to make.
Mr. Crawford: (02:56)
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Honorable Moultrie, Mr. Bray, thank you for
coming here today, we appreciate it to begin the open dialogue between
Congress and the executive branch on this important topic. While this
topic evokes creative imaginations of many, aside from all the hype and
speculation, there are important underlying issues posed by UAPs.
Despite the serious nature of this topic, I have to say I’m more
interested in our understanding of Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapon
development or understanding why this administration was so slow to
share actionable intelligence with the Ukrainians. However, in as much
as this topic may help us better understand unknown activities of Russia
and China, I am on board. The intelligence community has a serious duty
to our taxpayers to prevent potential adversaries such as China and
Russia from surprising us with unforeseen new technologies.
Mr. Crawford: (03:41)
As overseers of the intelligence community, this committee has an
obligation to understand what you are doing to determine whether any
UAPs are new technologies or not. And if they are, where are they coming
from? In general, the IC spends much of its time and resources trying
to understand what we call known unknowns. When it comes to foreign
nations’ weapons systems and sensor, known unknowns are those features
that we don’t fully understand yet. The challenge associated with UAP is
that they are completely unknown and require a more expansive
collection analysis effort. The intelligence community must balance
addressing known threats to our national security with preventing
technical surprise. We must continue to follow the facts where they lead
us and ensure that there are no technical surprises. The IC must take
it seriously when there are credible observations of phenomena that seem
to perform in ways that could pose a threat to safe flight operations
or that could be signs of a foreign adversary’s attempt to develop a
strategic technological surprise against the United States.
Mr. Crawford: (04:38)
It’s also essential that our pilots and others feel they can report UAPs
they observe without any stigma for doing so. This is the open
unclassified portion of our hearing, we’ll have a closed classified part
later. It’s important for the public to know that the classification of
information exists to protect national security not to try to hide the
truth. When we’re trying to determine if any UAPs or new technologies
being developed by foreign governments, we are inevitably going to run
into classified information about what new systems and technologies we
do know are in the works here or abroad. But where information does not
risk national security, it should be shared with our allies and the
public when feasible. I hope that we can have your assurance to this end
today. It’s my hope that the intelligence community will continue to
try to determine the nature of UAPs we’ve observed, and we’ll keep
Congress fully apprised of all developments. I look forward to this
hearing and continued dialogue and oversight with the intelligence
community on this topic. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Carson: (05:34)
Gentlemen yields back and now we’ll turn to our distinguished chairman Adam Schiff for any comments he wishes to make.
Adam Schiff: (05:39)
Thank you Chairman Carson for holding this open hearing on unidentified
aerial phenomenon and for your leadership on this issue. Holding a
portion of our discussion today an open session is critical to the cause
of transparency and openness, which was Congress’s intent in
authorizing and funding this new task force. The larger effort that is
being undertaken to study and characterize UAP reports is an important
step towards understanding these phenomenon, what we know and don’t
know. And I look forward to hearing more during both the open session
and the closed setting about how DOD and the IC are undertaking that
task. UAP reports have been around for decades, and yet we haven’t had
an orderly way for them to be reported without stigma and to be
investigated. That needs to change. UAP reports need to be understood as
a national security matter. And that message needs to go out across
DOD, the IC, and the whole of the US government.
Adam Schiff: (06:35)
When we spot something we don’t understand or can’t identify in our
airspace, it’s the job of those we entrust with our national security to
investigate and to report back. That is why it’s important that we hold
this open hearing for the public to hear directly from the Department
of Defense on the steps it’s taking to track, analyze, and transparently
communicate the work that is being done on this issue. It is also the
responsibility of our government and this panel to share as much as we
can with the American people since excessive secrecy only breeds
distrust and speculation. I look forward to hearing how the UAP task
force is being stood up, what challenges they still face and how this
committee can make sure the taskforce is able to shed light on one of
the world’s most enduring mysteries.
Adam Schiff: (07:20)
I thank you gentlemen for your work and I’ll very interested to hear
what you have to say. To me among the most fascinating questions, are
these phenomenon that we can measure, that is instruments report there
is something there, it is not the human eye confusing objects in the
sky, there is something there measurable by multiple instruments? And
yet it seems to move in directions that are inconsistent with what we
know of physics or science more broadly. And that to me poses questions
of tremendous interest and as well as potential national security
significance. So we look forward to hearing what you’re able to report
to us today in open session, and I want to thank Chairman Carson again
for his extraordinary leadership on this issue. And I yield back.
Mr. Carson: (08:09)
Chairman yields back, thank you. With that, we will start our hearing under Secretary Moultrie, the floor is yours sir.
Ronald Moultrie: (08:15)
Thank you. Chairman Schiff, Committee Chairman Carson, ranking member
Crawford, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it’s a privilege to
be here with you today to address your questions regarding Unidentified
Aerial Phenomenon or UAP. I’m pleased to be joined by Mr. Scott Bray,
the deputy director of Naval intelligence who will speak to the Navy’s
unidentified aerial phenomenon task force which laid the foundation for
the efforts we will discuss today. First, I’d like to thank Congress for
supporting the department’s UAP efforts. The NDAA for fiscal year 2022
has helped us to establish a dedicated office to oversee processes and
procedures for the timely collection, processing, analysis and reporting
of UAP related data. What are UAP? Put simply, UAP are airborne objects
that when encountered cannot be immediately identified. However, it is
the department’s contention that by combining appropriately structured
collected data with rigorous scientific analysis any object that we
encounter can likely be as isolated, characterized, identified, and if
necessary mitigated. We know that our service members have encountered
unidentified aerial phenomenon. And because UAPs pose potential flight
safety and general security risk, we are committed to a focused effort
to determine their origins. Our effort will include the thorough
examination of adversarial platforms and potential breakthrough
technologies, us government or commercial platforms, allied or partner
systems and other natural phenomenon. We also understand that there has
been a cultural stigma surrounding UAP. Our goal is to eliminate the
stigma by fully incorporating our operators and mission personnel into a
standardized data-gathering process. We believe that making UAP
reporting a mission imperative will be instrumental to the effort
success. The defense intelligence and security enterprise provides
real-time support to our war fighters and mission personnel across all
domains. To optimize the department’s UAP work, we are establishing an
office within this Office of the Secretary of Defense. That office’s
function is clear, to facilitate the identification of previously
unknown or unidentified airborne objects in methodical, logical, and
standardized manner.
Ronald Moultrie: (10:48)
These goals will ensure that we are working closely with operational
personnel on training and reporting requirements, developing data and
intelligence requirements, standardizing and integrating processes and
procedures for collection, operational surveillance, analysis and
reporting, leveraging our research and development capabilities to
improve detection, characterization, and identification of UAPs,
developing mitigating solutions and procedures and identifying strategy
and policy solutions. This effort will maximize collaboration and build
upon already existing relationships with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the FAA, DHS, and the FBI.
Ronald Moultrie: (11:29)
We are also committed to strong partnerships with the Department of
Energy NOAA, the DEA, NASA, and the National Labs, and just as
importantly, our international partners and allies. With regard to the
importance of transparency, the department is fully committed to the
principle of openness and accountability to the American people.
However, we are also mindful of our obligation to protect sensitive
sources and methods. Our goal is to strike that delicate balance, one
that enables us to maintain the public’s trust while preserving those
capabilities that are vital to support of our service personnel. In
closing, the department is committed to this effort and welcomes the
challenge. We thank you for your committed support and look forward to
your questions.
Scott Bray: (12:23)
Chairman Schiff, Chairman Carson, ranking member Crawford, and committee
members, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today to
highlight the ongoing work of the Department of Defense regarding
unidentified aerial phenomena. Since the early 2000s, we have seen an
increasing number of unauthorized and/or unidentified aircraft or
objects in military controlled training areas and training ranges and
other designated airspace. Reports of sightings are frequent and
continuing. We attribute this increase in reporting to a number of
factors, including our work to destigmatize reporting, an increase in
the number of new systems such as quadcopters and unmanned aerial
systems that are in our airspace. Identification of what we can classify
as clutter, mylar balloons and other types of air trash and
improvements in the capabilities of our various sensors to detect things
in our airspace.
Scott Bray: (13:14)
Almost two years ago in August of 2020, deputy secretary of defense
Norquist directed the establishment of the Unidentified Aerial Phenomena
task force within the department of the Navy. The UAP task force was
built on the foundation of the Navy’s initial efforts to respond to the
reports from our aviators on unidentified objects observed in our
training ranges. The basic issues then and now are twofold. First,
incursions in our training ranges by unidentified objects represent
serious hazards to safety of flight. In every aspect of Naval aviation
safety of our air crews is paramount. Second, intrusions by unknown
aircraft or objects pose potential threats to the security of our
operations.
Scott Bray: (13:56)
Our aviators train as they would fight. So any intrusions that may
compromise the security of our operations by revealing our capabilities,
our tactics, techniques or procedures are of great concern to the Navy
and the Department of Defense. From the very beginning, we took these
reports very seriously. We instituted a data-driven approach to the
investigations where we could collect as much data as possible and use
all available resources to analyze and make informed decisions on the
best ways to address our findings. Our main objective was to transition
UAP efforts from an anecdotal or narrative based approach to a rigorous
science and technology engineering focused study.
Scott Bray: (14:41)
This data driven approach requires input from a wide variety of sources.
In the early stages, the task force worked to standardize the reporting
mechanisms and processes to make it as easy as possible for personnel
to report any engagement so that we were getting that wide range of
reporting that we needed. We also spent considerable efforts engaging
directly with our Naval aviators and building relationships to help
destigmatize the active reporting sightings or encounters. And we worked
with Naval aviation leadership to provide additional equipment to
record any encounter. Navy and Air Force crews now have step-by-step
procedures for reporting on UAP on their kneeboard in the cockpit and in
their post flight debrief procedures. The direct result of those
efforts has been increased reporting with increased opportunities to
focus on number of sensors on any objects.
Scott Bray: (15:34)
The message is now clear, if you see something, you need to report it.
And the message has been received. In fact, recently, I received a call
from a senior Naval aviator with over 2,000 flight hours. He called me
personally from the flight line after landing to talk about an encounter
that he had just experienced. Those were just the initial steps. We
also made a concerted effort to assemble subject matter experts from
across the Department of Defense and the intelligence community and
other US government agencies and departments. We forged partnerships
with the research development and acquisition communities, with industry
partners, and with academic research labs. And we brought many allies
and international partners into our discussions on UAP.
Scott Bray: (16:15)
Additionally, subject matter experts from a wide variety of fields,
including physics, optics, metallurgy, meteorology, just to name a few
have been brought in to expand our understanding in areas where we may
not have organic expertise. In short, we’ve endeavored to bring an all
hands-on deck approach to better understand this phenomena. So what have
we learned so far? Any given observation may be fleeting or longer, it
may be recorded or not. It may be observable by one or multiple assets.
In short, there’s rarely an easy answer. For example, let me share with
you the first video that we have here today which shows an observation
in real time.
Scott Bray: (17:00)
There it was. In many cases, that’s all that a report may include. And
in many other cases, we have far less than this. As we detailed in both
the unclassified and classified versions of the preliminary assessment
released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence last
June, this often limited amount of high quality data and reporting
hampers our ability to draw firm conclusions about the nature or intent
of UAP. As detailed in the ODNI report, if and when individual UAP
incidents are resolved, they likely fall into one of five potential
explanatory categories, airborne clutter, natural atmospheric phenomena,
US government or US industry developmental programs, foreign adversary
systems or a other bin that allows for a holding bin of difficult cases
and for the possibility of surprise and potential scientific discovery.
We stand by those initial results.
Scott Bray: (18:06)
Since the release of that preliminary report, UAP task force database
has now grown to contain approximately 400 reports. The stigma has been
reduced. We’ve also made progress in resolving the character of a
limited number of UAP encounters. For example, let me show you another
video and image taken years apart in different areas. In this video, US
Navy personnel recorded what appears to be a triangle, some flashing
recorded several years ago off the coast of the United States. This was
recorded while the US Navy ship observed a number of small unmanned
aerial systems in the area. And importantly, the video was taken through
night vision goggles with a single lens reflex camera. These remained
unresolved for several years. Several years later and off a different
coast, US Navy personnel again in a swarm of unmanned aerial systems and
again through night vision goggles and an SLR camera recorded this
image. But this time the other US Navy assets also observed unmanned
aerial systems nearby and were now reasonably confident that these
triangles correlate to unmanned aerial systems in the area. The
triangular appearance is a result of light passing through the night
vision goggles and then being recorded by an SLR camera. I don’t mean to
suggest that everything that we observe is identifiable, but this is a
great example of how it takes considerable effort to understand what
we’re seeing in the examples that we are able to collect. In this
example, we accumulate efficient data from two similar encounters from
two different time periods in two different geographic areas to help us
draw these conclusions.
Scott Bray: (20:20)
That’s not always the case though. We recognize that can be unsatisfying
or insufficient in the eyes of many. This is a popular topic in our
nation with various theories as to what these objects may be and where
they originate. By nature, we are all curious and we seek to understand
the unknown. And as a lifelong intelligence professional, I’m impatient,
I want immediate explanations for this as much as anyone else. However,
understanding can take significant time and effort. It’s why we’ve
endeavored to concentrate on this data-driven process, to drive
fact-based results. And given the nature of our business, national
defense, we’ve had to sometimes be less forthcoming with information and
open forums than many would hope.
Scott Bray: (21:03)
If UAP do indeed represent a potential threat to our security, then the
capabilities, systems, processes, and sources we use to observe recorded
study or analyze these phenomena need to be classified at appropriate
levels. We do not want, we do not want potential adversaries to know
exactly what we’re able to see or understand or how we come to the
conclusions we make. Therefore public disclosures must be carefully
considered on a case by case basis. So what’s next? We’re concentrating
on a seamless transition to the new organization and future analysis of
complicated issues of UAP issues will greatly benefit from the
infrastructure of the process and the procedures that we’ve developed to
date. I’m confident that the task force under Navy leadership has
forged a path forward that will allow us to anchor assessments in
science and engineering vice anecdotal evidence. We remain committed to
that goal as I know the USDI organization does as well. So thank you
very much for your interest in continuing support for the UAP task force
Scott Bray: (22:03)
So, thank you very much for your interest and continuing support for the
UAP task force. The team’s made a lot of progress, but we really are
just establishing the foundation for the more detailed analysis that’s
yet to be done. And with your continued support, we can sustain that
momentum necessary to produce data-centric analysis in understanding the
phenomena. I look forward to your question. Thank you.
Mr. Carson: (22:18)
Thank you, Mr. Bray. This is the third version of this task force, and
to be Frank, one of Congress’s concerns is that the executive branch, in
administration from both parties, has been sweeping concerns about
UAP’s under the rug by focusing on events that can be explained and
avoiding events that cannot be explained. What can you say to give the
American people confidence that you aren’t just focusing our attention
on low hanging fruit with easy explanations?
Ronald Moultrie: (22:58)
Congressman, I’ll start, and then Mr. Bray, please feel free to weigh
in. So, the way that we’re approaching this is with a more thorough
standardized methodology than what we had in the past. First and
foremost, the Secretary of Defense is chartering this effort. This is
not someone lower in the Department of Defense. And he has assigned that
task to the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary for
Intelligence Security, that’s me, because I’m responsible for looking at
intelligence matters, I’m responsible for security matters. This is
potentially both. So, when you start concerning ourselves with the
safety of our personnel, the safety of our installations and bases,
there’s no other higher priority than what we have than actually getting
after this.
Ronald Moultrie: (23:46)
And as you have stated, we have been assigned that task to actually
stand up an office. The AOIMSG, which I believe the name, sir, will
likely change, but we have moved forward in terms of moving to establish
that office. We have, as of this week, picked the director for that
effort. Very established and accomplished individual. We’ve identified
spaces. We’ve worked with personnel across the Department of Defense,
with the services, and we’ve worked with the IC, which is on board in
helping us work through this standardized methodology for now bringing
in data, analyzing that data, and reporting that data in the appropriate
method appropriate means so we can either get it to our service
personnel to ensure their safety or get it to you and the Congress and
to the public to ensure that you have oversight to what we’re doing. So,
chartered by the Secretary of Defense, standardized, and really, a
methodical approach. It’s something that we’re doing that has not been
done before.
Mr. Carson: (24:52)
Can we get some kinds of assurances that your analysts will follow the facts where they lead and assess all hypotheses?
Ronald Moultrie: (25:00)
Absolutely. So, we’re open to all hypotheses. We’re open to any conclusions that we may encounter.
Mr. Carson: (25:08)
Quickly, before I pass it to the ranking member and Chairman Schiff, I
want to thank you both for taking the time, and I had a good time
meeting with you last week, Under Secretary Moultrie. It’s fair to say
that you are a science fiction fan, is that correct?
Ronald Moultrie: (25:26)
It’s fair to say that I am an inquisitive mind who has spent 40 years in
the intelligence field and has focused on both science and science
fiction. That is fair.
Mr. Carson: (25:37)
Could you tell us about it?
Ronald Moultrie: (25:38)
Yeah. Well, look, my generation grew up looking at space sagas and the
Apollo program, so all of us who grew up in the ’60s were just thrilled
by watching our first astronaut land on the moon. That was a momentous
occasion to people who were of different generations. Some of them
didn’t believe that happened. I still have relatives and friends who
don’t believe it happened. Right? Science fiction to them. But to us, it
was… No, that’s the progress that we’ve made. And so, I was enthralled
by that and I’ve taken that to heart. I enjoy the challenge of what may
be out there.
Ronald Moultrie: (26:19)
I have mentioned to you that, yes, I have followed science fiction. I
have gone to conventions. Even I’ll say it on the record. Got to break
the ice somehow. But I have done that. Right? But there’s nothing wrong
with that. Don’t necessarily dress up. But I do believe that it’s
important to show that the Department of Defense has… We have character,
and we’re people just like you, just like the American people. We have
our inquisitiveness, we have our questions. We want to know what’s out
there as much as you want to know what’s out there. We get the questions
not just from you, we get it from family members and we get them night
and day, not just in committee hearings. So, finding what’s out there is
important, but first, and foremost, it’s important for us to do that so
that we can ensure that our people, our personnel, our aviators, our
bases and installations are safe. And then that curiosity factor is
something else that we just want to know because that’s the human race.
It’s just that insatiable desire to know.
Mr. Carson: (27:22)
Thank you, sir. Ranking Member Crawford?
Mr. Crawford: (27:25)
Mr. Moultrie, you said you don’t necessarily dress up. That wasn’t a
real strong statement. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. We
appreciate it. And thank you, Mr. Moultrie, for breaking the ice the way
you did. Appreciate that. The inability to understand objects in our
sensitive operating areas is tantamount to an intelligence failure that
we certainly want to avoid. This is not about finding alien spacecraft,
but about delivering dominant intelligence across the tactical,
operational, and strategic spectrum. So, my question is how can AIMSG
lead to prevention of intelligence surprises?
Ronald Moultrie: (28:04)
Sure. I’ll start with that. So, the goal of our effort is to integrate
it into what we already do on a normal basis, which is look for the
unknown unknowns, congressman, as you stated in your opening remarks,
across all domains. So, we’ve been doing this for decades. We’ve been
looking at the space domain, looking at space objects, looking at space
weather, looking at space phenomena. We’ve been looking at things in the
air domain. As you know, we… And I’ll talk more about this in
classified session. But we have a very concerted effort to understand
adversarial platforms and adversarial developmental programs, and we do
that also in the ground domain. And of course, we’re very interested in
what happens in the underwater or sea domain, if you will, subsurface
domain.
Ronald Moultrie: (28:48)
So, if there are objects that are aviators or air crews are encountering
in this air domain and their sensors are discovering or detecting some
of these objects, we want to just bring that in to the normal process
that we have for identifying unknown unknowns. We want to make sure we
have the intelligence requirements that allow us not only to look at
that event from the time that it occurs forward, but maybe,
retrospectively, we want to go back and see if we can get to the left of
that event to say, “Was there some developmental program that we,” to
get to your technical surprise issue, sir, “that we should have known
about? And if so, how do we put that intelligence requirement in place
to ensure that we are following an adversarial development or any other
development that may be out there?” So, that’s what we want to do in
terms of normalizing this and bringing it into the normal process of how
we identify unknown unknowns.
Mr. Crawford: (29:44)
So, you mentioned fidelity, and I think it’s important to talk about the
relationship from… The Navy is the lead agency on this. How do you
interact with Space Force, Air Force to create that degree of fidelity?
We’re talking about the sensors and so on. And I guess, where I have
some concerns that many of the images that we see commonly in this
committee, and even in open source, the resolution and the clarity that
would allow a robust technical intelligence analysis is challenging. So
is, AIMSG prepared to address the quality and quantity of data collected
on UAP to advance intelligence collection, and do you have the adequate
sensors you need to collect that high quality data?
Ronald Moultrie: (30:29)
One of the lines of effort that we have is looking at our sensor
capabilities and to understand whether or not, as the video show that
Mr. Bray displayed, sometimes it’s very fleeting data that we have on
some of these objects. And we want to make sure that, one, our systems
are calibrated to actually be able to collect on the objects. Our
sensors today, they’re calibrated for specific things. We want to make
sure they’re calibrated for things of this nature, things of this size,
things of this velocity, if I can use that term. We want to make sure
that once we have that, that that data is stored in some standardized
method that we can then extract and that we can feed into our system
real-time. So, we do not want this to take some prolonged period of time
for us to get that data.
Ronald Moultrie: (31:16)
But our goal is absolutely to have that high fidelity information that
we get from all sensors, and we want to be able to integrate that with
what we may have off of ground-based sensors. So, whatever we may have
on a platform, whatever we may have on the ground, whatever we may have
from other sensors that we may have in different domains, we want to be
able to integrate that all and get this integrated picture as we would,
as I said, with any other unidentified objects or things that we are
tracking as a part of our normal intelligence responsibilities.
Mr. Crawford: (31:44)
Thank you. Last question. Mr. Bray, if you would… I’m a Navy pilot, I’ve
encountered a UAP. Walk me through the reporting protocol once I see
something that I think needs reported.
Scott Bray: (31:58)
The first thing that that aviator would do after landing as a part of
their normal debriefing is they would contact their intelligence
officer. Their intelligence officer would then walk them through first
filing a… first, actually, data preservation to ensure that whatever
sensor data may be on the aircraft, that we preserve that so that it’s
available for later analysis.
Scott Bray: (32:21)
Second, they would actually fill out a form that includes details like
where they were operating, altitudes they were operating, speeds, what
they observed, whatever sensor data they may have recorded from that.
And then that report is filed. It goes two places. One, it goes through
the operational chain of command so that operational units are aware of
what’s being observed, and also through the UAP task force so that they
can take that data, database it, and, quite often, have individuals from
the task force contact the aviator and ask them additional questions if
there were things that weren’t clear in the report. That then goes into
a database where we be able to compare it with other observations that
we have. Again, comparing for locations, comparing for altitudes,
speeds, shapes, if any RF emissions were detected from the platform, all
of that, so that we can try to reach some conclusions on that.
Mr. Crawford: (33:25)
Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Carson: (33:27)
Gentleman yields back. Chairman Schiff?
Adam Schiff: (33:29)
Thanks, chairman. Mr. Bray, can you rerun that first image that looked
like it was outside of a plane window? And if you wouldn’t mind going up
to the screen and tell us what we’re seeing. Not that you can
necessarily tell us what we’re seeing, but explain what we should be
looking at in that first image.
Scott Bray: (33:48)
Absolutely. And Alexi, what I’ll ask is if you can stop it at a certain point.
Adam Schiff: (34:23)
And are we looking outside of a civilian aircraft window? Is that what we’re looking at?
Scott Bray: (34:28)
You’re looking outside a US Navy F-18.
Adam Schiff: (34:31)
Okay.
Scott Bray: (34:32)
And [inaudible 00:34:39] shows how difficult the analysis is. Go just
little farther forward, Alexi. As you can see, [inaudible 00:35:17].
What you’ll find eventually on this, when we find the right frame
[inaudible 00:35:22] frame here [inaudible 00:35:25] right through here
[inaudible 00:35:31] the aircraft [inaudible 00:35:33].
Adam Schiff: (35:38)
Is that it right there?
Scott Bray: (35:40)
[inaudible 00:35:40].
Adam Schiff: (35:43)
Can you point to the screen again what we’re supposed to be looking at?
Scott Bray: (36:24)
[inaudible 00:36:24].
Adam Schiff: (36:26)
Okay. If you could stop that frame.
Scott Bray: (36:28)
[inaudible 00:36:28] that’s not the one.
Adam Schiff: (36:28)
That’s not the one.
Scott Bray: (36:46)
[inaudible 00:36:46]. Everyone will see coming up right here is a
[inaudible 00:36:55]. No, back up just a little bit. A spherical object
right here, zooms by the window right in this area right here. There we
go. Could you see that part right there again going by? I think we’re
having a hard time stopping at the right spot.
Adam Schiff: (37:26)
Okay.
Scott Bray: (37:26)
So, as you can see, it’s difficult… And I think part of the issue here
is the laptop we’re working with is not as easy for us stopping that
video in the right spot.
Adam Schiff: (37:37)
Well, describe what we have seen in that. What are we observing?
Scott Bray: (37:42)
What you see here is aircraft that is operating in a US Navy training
range that has observed spherical object in that area, and as they fly
by it, they take a video. You see a… It looks reflective in this video,
somewhat reflective, and it quickly passes by the cockpit of the
aircraft.
Adam Schiff: (38:10)
And is this one of the phenomenon that we can’t explain?
Scott Bray: (38:13)
I do not have an explanation for what this specific object is.
Adam Schiff: (38:19)
And is this one of the situations where it is… That’s the object that
we’re looking at right there? Thank you. And is this a situation where
it was observed by the pilot and it was also recorded by the aircraft’s
instruments?
Scott Bray: (38:35)
We’ll talk about the multi-sensor part in a later session, but in this case, we have at least that.
Adam Schiff: (38:47)
In the Director of National Intelligence 2021 unclassified report, the
ODNI reported 144 UAPs between 2004 and 2021, 80% of which were recorded
on multiple instruments. And I take it, with respect to some of those,
you had a pilot, seeing them, if it was observed by a pilot, and you had
multiple instruments recording it. So, you really have three sensors:
the human sensor, and two technical sensors detecting the object, is
that right?
Scott Bray: (39:24)
For the majority of incidents that we had in last year’s report, the
majority had multi-sensor data. When I talk about the 400 reports that
we have now, that number will certainly go down because a lot of those
new reports that we have are actually historic reports that are
narrative-based, so that percentage will go down just as a factor of the
fact that the de-stigmatization has resulted in more narrative reports.
Adam Schiff: (39:53)
And that’s the object we’re looking at right there now, right?
Scott Bray: (39:55)
That’s it right there.
Adam Schiff: (39:56)
Okay. Last year’s report also said that of those a 144, 18 of them
reportedly appeared to exhibit unusual flight characteristics, appear to
demonstrate advanced technology, and some of them appeared to remain
stationary in winds aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or
move at considerable speed without discernible means of propulsion.
That’s pretty intriguing. And if you’re able to answer this in this
setting, are we aware of any foreign adversary capable of moving objects
without any discernible means of propulsion?
Scott Bray: (40:48)
Without discernible means of propulsion, I would say that we’re not
aware of any adversary that can move an object without discernible means
of propulsion. The question then becomes in many of these cases where
we don’t have a discernible mean of propulsion in the data that we have,
in some cases, there is likely sensor artifacts that may be hiding some
of that. There’s certainly some degree of something that looks like
signature management that we have seen from some of these UAP, but I
would caution, I would simply say that there are a number of events in
which we do not have an explanation, in which… And there are a small
handful in which there are flight characteristics or signature
management that we can’t explain with the data that we have.
Scott Bray: (41:40)
Those are obviously the ones that are of most interest to us. Earlier,
when we asked about how you avoid technological surprise, the biggest
way you avoid technological surprise is by collecting this type of data
and by, importantly, calibrating the assumptions that you go into with
how you do that analysis. I’ll tell you within the UAP task force, we
have one basic assumption, and that is that, generally speaking,
generally speaking, our sensors operate as designed. And we make that
assumption because, many times, these are multi-sensor collections. We
make no assumptions about the origin of this or that there may or may
not be some sort of technology that we don’t understand. That’s, I
think, the key to avoiding technological surprises by calibrating those
assumptions.
Adam Schiff: (42:24)
And finally, with respect to the second two videos showing the small
triangles, the hypothesis is that those are commercial drones that,
because of the use of night vision goggles, appear like triangles, is
that the operating assessment?
Scott Bray: (42:43)
Some type of drone. Some type of unmanned aerial system. And it is
simply that that light source resolves itself through the night vision
goggles onto the SLR camera as a triangle.
Adam Schiff: (42:58)
And have we, in order to prove that hypothesis, flown a drone and
observed it with that same technology to see whether we can reproduce
the effect?
Scott Bray: (43:10)
UAP task force is aware of studies that have done that.
Adam Schiff: (43:12)
Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Carson: (43:16)
Gentlemen yields back. Dr. Winstrop?
Dr. Winstrop: (43:20)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. My first question
is through this process where there’s been sightings, have the
sightings been stationary, or have they always been cited from a moving
object, from a plane or a ship that may be moving? Have these reports
ever come from a stationary object being observed in the sky?
Scott Bray: (43:48)
The UAP task force does have reports from a stationary observer.
Dr. Winstrop: (43:56)
Okay. Because there’s a difference observing something when you’re
moving, as well. It’s physics, right? That’s why I asked that question.
Are we capable-
Dr. Winstrop: (44:03)
That’s right.
Scott Bray: (44:03)
Right.
Dr. Winstrop: (44:03)
That’s why I asked that question. Are we capable or have we made any
breakthroughs or anyone made any breakthroughs to be able to cite
something and make some determination at all of its composition, whether
it’s a solid or a gas? Is there any such capability?
Scott Bray: (44:25)
From-
Dr. Winstrop: (44:25)
I’m not asking what I’m just-
Scott Bray: (44:27)
From some of the returns, I mean, it’s clear that the majority … Well,
it’s clear that many of the observations we have are physical objects
from the sensor data that we have.
Dr. Winstrop: (44:38)
Well, gas is a physical object. It can be. Do you see where I’m going
with this? I’m trying to determine what it is we’re looking at so if we
can decide if something is a solid or a gas. And have there have been
any conclusion on its capabilities, like it’s capabilities of movement,
of turning, going 180 degrees, or 90 degree turn, anything along that
line that we’ve been able to determine?
Scott Bray: (45:04)
Within the … And again, I should point out that that there is not a
single explanation for UAP. They make up … There are a lot of different
things that are unidentified phenomenon.
Dr. Winstrop: (45:15)
Basically, we really don’t know much on that. That’s all I’m trying to
get at. And I’m pleased that you have protocol right now for our
military, but are there any non-military reports coming forward of
similar events, or is it all coming from military?
Scott Bray: (45:30)
The UAP task force has a very good working relationship with the FAA.
They have very good working relationship with other parts of the USs
government so that we can ingest reports from those sources.
Dr. Winstrop: (45:41)
Do we have any reports, non-military?
Scott Bray: (45:44)
Yes.
Dr. Winstrop: (45:45)
Thank you. That’s my question. And do we need to put out protocol for
civilians that may be in that arena, like through FAA? Do you think that
would be appropriate and helpful?
Scott Bray: (45:56)
I think standardized the reporting without a doubt is key to helping us get to ascertain what some of these are.
Dr. Winstrop: (46:04)
I think it would be important as well. There are other people besides
the US that have had these experiences and reported them, is that
correct?
Scott Bray: (46:15)
There are. That’s correct.
Dr. Winstrop: (46:17)
Is it all of our allies or is it allies and adversaries? What have we learned publicly?
Ronald Moultrie: (46:24)
So some of that, I think, sir, we’ll save for closed session.
Dr. Winstrop: (46:28)
Well, that goes to my next question. Publicly, have others made anything
which would not have to be considered closed? I don’t want you to
answer what they’ve said necessarily.
Scott Bray: (46:38)
Allies have seen these. China has established its own version of a UAP
task force. So clearly a number of countries have observations of things
in the airspace that they can’t identify.
Dr. Winstrop: (46:50)
And do we share data with some, with all, are they sharing with us?
Scott Bray: (46:58)
We share data with some and some share data with us.
Dr. Winstrop: (47:02)
But not necessarily all that have publicly reported something?
Scott Bray: (47:05)
That’s correct.
Dr. Winstrop: (47:06)
Okay. And I think that’s an important thing and for the other session,
actually that we don’t discuss that now because obviously something like
this can be a national security challenge for us, and no doubt about
it. If they’re developed by an adversary through some breakthrough
technology, they can be very disruptive to our military actions or at
least serve as a destruction. So my caution would be, be careful who we
share our data with and don’t necessarily trust some of the data we may
get from someone else. And with that, a yield back.
Mr. Chairman: (47:50)
Gentlemen yields back. Mr. Himes.
Jim Himes: (47:55)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the objectives of this open hearing is
to try to erode some of the stigma that attaches to, in particular, our
military men and women reporting this. It’s obviously really very
serious because should one of our adversaries have developed a
technology that we don’t know about it, we need to know about it
yesterday. And obviously any sort of stigma that prevents our military
from reporting this data as comprehensively as possible is a national
security threat. So I really just have two questions in the service of
that goal. The first is the chairman asked that we run that video again.
Most people when they see a video, we’re all used to seeing things from
a car, seeing things from a sidewalk, very few people have the
experience of observing something through night vision goggles at Mach
1.5. So just talk for a minute about if you would, whichever of you is
most appropriate, how radically different observation is at high speed
in three dimension than it is for most of us who walk around and drive
cars.
Scott Bray: (49:04)
So the first thing I think that’s important to note about this is there
are lots of things when you are moving very fast and an object is
between you and a stationary reference point like the ground, it gives a
lot of different impressions about how quickly something is or isn’t
moving. And it actually means that it is a challenge, especially with
narrative-based data to get a lot of information on that. That’s why the
sensor data is so important because things do happen very quickly as
you see there. And sometimes things that happen very quickly, something
may be moving very slow. That aircraft is moving quite fast. How fast
that object is moving that goes by is probably very slow.
Jim Himes: (49:46)
So I guess my point is that an observation, either a visual observation
or a electronic observation, infrared or whatever looks radically
different than it does to most people. Even instruments, instruments are
on gimbals and that sort of thing, so that creates a very unusual view
to, again, those of us who are used to seeing things in two dimensions
largely. And second question, I think Mr. Bray, you said something that I
want to unpack a little bit. A number of these UAPs you said we can’t
explain. Again in the service of sort of reducing speculation and
conspiracy theories, we can’t explain can range from a visual
observation that was distant on a foggy night, we don’t know what it is
to we’ve found an organic material that we can’t identify, right? Those
are radically different worlds.
Jim Himes: (50:46)
So when you say we can’t explain, give the public a little bit better
sense of where on that spectrum of we can’t explain we are. Are we
holding materials, organic or inorganic, that we don’t know about? Are
we picking up emanations that are something other than light or infrared
that it could be deemed to be communications? Give us a sense for what
you mean when you say we can’t explain.
Scott Bray: (51:09)
Sure. When I say we can’t explain, I mean, exactly as you described
there, that there is a lot of information like the video that we showed
in which there’s simply too little data to create a reasonable
explanation. There are a small handful of cases in which we have more
data that our analysis simply hasn’t been able to fully pull together a
picture of what happened. And those are the cases where we talk about
where we see some indications of flight characteristics or signature
management that are not what we had expected.
Scott Bray: (51:43)
When it comes to material that we have, we have no material, we have
detected no emanations within the UAP task force that would suggest it’s
anything non-terrestrial in origin. So when I say unexplained, I mean
everything from too little data to the data that we have doesn’t point
us towards an explanation. But we’ll go wherever the data takes us.
Again, we’ve made no assumptions about what this is or isn’t. We’re
committed to understanding these and so we’ll go wherever that data
takes us.
Jim Himes: (52:16)
Thank you. That’s very helpful and so I think it bears emphasis. When
you say we can’t explain, everything that you can’t explain is in a
bucket called data, is that correct? And that would mean data collected
by sensors, visual observations, everything that we can’t explain,
quote-unquote, is in a bucket called data.
Scott Bray: (52:37)
Right. A narrative report from the early 2000s if it just had a little
bit of information on it, it would be in our database and it would be
unresolved.
Ronald Moultrie: (52:46)
I would add to that it’s insufficient data. I mean, that’s one of the
challenges we have. Insufficient data either on the event itself, the
object itself, or insufficient data or plugin with some other
organization or agency that may have had something in that space at that
time. So it’s a data issue that we’re facing in many of these
instances, Congressmen.
Jim Himes: (53:07)
Understood. Thank you very much. Yield back.
Mr. Chairman: (53:09)
Gentlemen, yields back. Mr. Gallagher.
Michael Gallagher: (53:12)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to join this hearing.
I really appreciate the witnesses’ testimony. Mr. Moultrie, as the
chairman mentioned, DOD had an initiative to study UFOs in the 1960s
called Project Blue Book. It’s also been well reported in our briefing
and in other places that we had more recent projects, specifically
AATIP. Could you describe any other initiatives that the DOD or DOD
contractors have managed after project Blue Book ended and prior to
AATIP beginning? Did anything also predate Project Blue Book?
Ronald Moultrie: (53:48)
So I can’t speak to what may have predated Project Blue Book. I mean, of
course, there’s Roswell and all these other things that people have
talked about over the years. I’m familiar with Blue Book. I’m familiar
with AATIP. I haven’t seen other documented studies that have been done
by DOD in that regard.
Michael Gallagher: (54:07)
So you’re not aware of anything in between Project Blue Book and AATIP?
Ronald Moultrie: (54:11)
Not aware of anything that’s official that was done in between those two. It hasn’t been brought to my attention.
Michael Gallagher: (54:17)
Okay. Additionally, are you aware of any other DOD or DOD contract
programs focused on UAPs from a technological engineering perspective?
And by that, I mean, are you aware of any technology initiatives focused
on this topic other than initiatives focused on the individual case
investigations?
Ronald Moultrie: (54:35)
I am not aware of any contractual programs that are focused on anything
related to this other than what we are doing in the Navy task force and
what we are about to launch in terms of our effort.
Michael Gallagher: (54:48)
Same question for you, Mr. Bray.
Scott Bray: (54:51)
Same answer, not aware of anything outside what we are doing in the UAP task force.
Michael Gallagher: (54:55)
So just to confirm, you’re not aware of any technology or engineering
resources that have been focused on these efforts, besides what we’ve
mentioned today?
Ronald Moultrie: (55:03)
Once again, I’ll say no contractual or programmatic efforts that are involved. The reason why I qualify that-
Michael Gallagher: (55:13)
Explain.
Ronald Moultrie: (55:13)
Yeah, let me qualify it that way. I can’t speak to what people may be
looking at in the department. Somebody says, I’m looking at something,
I’m looking at something that may be unidentified. And I can’t speak to
that. I can speak to official programs that we have on the record.
Michael Gallagher: (55:26)
It’s also been reported that there have been UAP observed and
interacting with and flying over sensitive military facilities,
particularly, and not just ranges, but some facilities housing are
strategic nuclear forces. One such incident allegedly occurred at
Malmstrom Air Force Base in which 10 of our nuclear ICBMs were rendered
inoperable. At the same time, a glowing red orb was observed overhead.
I’m not commenting on the accuracy of this. I’m simply asking you
whether you’re aware of it and whether you have any comment on the
accuracy of that report.
Ronald Moultrie: (55:55)
Let me pass that to Mr. Bray. You’ve been looking at UAPs over the last three years.
Scott Bray: (55:58)
That data is not within the holdings of the UAP task force.
Michael Gallagher: (56:03)
Okay. But are you aware of the report or that the data exists somewhere?
Scott Bray: (56:09)
I have heard stories. I have not seen the official data on that.
Michael Gallagher: (56:14)
So you’ve just seen informal stories, no official assessment that you’ve
done or exists within DOD that you’re aware of regarding the Malmstrom
incident?
Scott Bray: (56:25)
All I can speak to is what’s within my cognizant at the UAP task force, and we have not looked at that incident.
Michael Gallagher: (56:31)
Well, I would say, I mean, it’s a pretty high profile incident. I don’t
claim to be an expert on this, but that’s out there in the ether. You’re
the guys investigating it. I mean, who else is doing it?
Ronald Moultrie: (56:42)
If something was officially brought to our attention, we would look at
it. There are many things that are out there in the ether that aren’t
officially brought to our attention.
Michael Gallagher: (56:49)
So how would it have to be officially brought to your attention? I’m bringing it to your attention.
Ronald Moultrie: (56:52)
Sure.
Michael Gallagher: (56:53)
So this is pretty official.
Ronald Moultrie: (56:54)
Sure. So we’ll go back and take a look at it. But generally, there is
some authoritative figure that says there is an incident that occurred,
we’d like you to look at this. But in terms of just tracking what may be
in the media that says that something occurred at this time at this
place, there are probably be a lot of leads that we would have to follow
up on. I don’t think we have the resource to do that right now.
Michael Gallagher: (57:13)
Well, I don’t claim to be an authoritative figure, but for what it’s worth, I would like you to look in into it.
Ronald Moultrie: (57:17)
Sure.
Michael Gallagher: (57:17)
If for no other reason, you could dismiss it and say, this is not worth wasting resources on.
Ronald Moultrie: (57:22)
Will do.
Michael Gallagher: (57:22)
And then finally, are you aware of a document that appeared around 2019
sometimes called the Admiral Wilson Memo or EW Notes memo?
Ronald Moultrie: (57:32)
I am not.
Michael Gallagher: (57:33)
You’re not.
Ronald Moultrie: (57:33)
Are you?
Scott Bray: (57:34)
I’m not personally aware of that.
Michael Gallagher: (57:35)
Okay. This is a document in which, again, I’m not commenting on the
veracity, I was hoping you would help me with that, in which a former
head of DIA claims to have had a conversation with the Dr. Eric Wilson
and claims to have sort of been made aware of certain contractors or DOD
programs that he tried to get fuller access to and was denied access
to. So you’re not aware of that?
Ronald Moultrie: (57:59)
I’m not aware, Congressman.
Michael Gallagher: (58:00)
In my 10 seconds remaining then, I guess I just would ask Mr. Chairman unanimous consent to enter that memo into the record.
Mr. Chairman: (58:08)
Without objection.
Michael Gallagher: (58:09)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman: (58:10)
Mr. Krishnamoorthi.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (58:15)
Thank you, Ms. Chair, and thank you to both of you for appearing today
and for your public service. First question is, there have been no
collisions between any US assets in one of these UAPs, correct?
Scott Bray: (58:28)
We have not had a collision. We’ve had at least 11 near misses though.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (58:32)
And maybe we’ll talk about those 11 near misses or any place where
there’s close proximity. I assume, or tell me if I’m wrong, there’s been
no attempt … there’s no communications or any kind of communication
signals that emanate from those objects that we’ve detected, correct?
Scott Bray: (58:56)
That’s correct.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (58:57)
And have we attempted to communicate with those objects?
Scott Bray: (59:02)
No.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (59:03)
So we don’t even put out a alert saying US, identify yourself, you are
within our flight path, or something like that? We haven’t said anything
like that?
Scott Bray: (59:19)
We’ve not put anything out like that. Generally speaking, for example,
in the video that we showed earlier, it appears to be something that is
unmanned, appears to be something that may or may not be in controlled
flight, and so we’ve not attempted any communication with that.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (59:40)
Okay. And I assume we’ve never discharged any armaments against a UAP, correct?
Scott Bray: (59:47)
That’s correct.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (59:49)
How about wreckage, have we come across any wreckage of any kind of object that has now been examined by you?
Scott Bray: (01:00:01)
The UAP task force doesn’t have any wreckage that isn’t explainable, that isn’t consistent with being of terrestrial origin.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:00:07)
Do we have any sensors underwater to detect on submerged UAPs, anything that is in the ocean or in the seas?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:00:18)
So I think that would be more appropriately addressed in closed session, sir.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:00:21)
Okay. I think one of the biggest questions that I have is we say with a
lot of probability, we say that, quote-unquote, probably do represent
physical objects, close quote. When we say probably is that because we
cannot conclusively say that they are physical objects?
Scott Bray: (01:00:48)
In the task force report when I say probably represent physical objects,
most of them represent physical objects. There could be some that are
more of a meteorological phenomena, something like that may not maybe be
a physical object in the sense that most people think of something you
could go up and touch.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:01:08)
But the ones where you say most of them represent physical objects, can
you say that they are definitely, with a hundred percent certainty that
they are physical objects?
Scott Bray: (01:01:19)
I can say with certainty that a number of these are physical objects.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:01:23)
Okay. So we can’t rule out that some of them may not be physical objects?
Scott Bray: (01:01:28)
Some certainly could be a sensor anomaly or something like that. Some could be.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:01:33)
Now, how about with regard to UAPs, we’ve talked about UIPs on training
areas, but obviously there’s some sensor bias. I would think we put
sensors in training areas. How about with regards to non-training areas,
do we track what’s an open source and what civilians and others have
tracked, and have we found similarities to what they’ve observed in
terms of UAPs in non-training areas to the ones that are in training
areas?
Scott Bray: (01:02:06)
The UAP taskforce has worked very hard to make sure the data set that
we’re working with is a data set that we have very good control over
that data. So we have some partnerships with FAA so that we get some of
that. So we get that reporting in. But if it comes to just open source
reports or someone says that they saw something, that generally does not
make it into our database.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:02:28)
So basically, it sounds like we have a good partnership with FAA, but
apart from FAA, we don’t have partnerships with other agencies or other
entities that might be tracking so that we could enlarge our data set to
make comparison?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:02:45)
But we will. So that’s the goal of this next effort will be to expand
that relationship with the rest of the government and the interagency,
so we can understand what they’re seeing, what we’re seeing. We can
correlate on each other’s holdings and hopefully, resolve this.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:02:59)
Sorry to interrupt. But I think that we might have a bias right now
going on with regards to just reporting on UAPs being in training areas
when we don’t really track what’s happening elsewhere. The last
question, have our encounters with UAPs altered the development of
either our offensive or defensive capabilities, or even our sensor
capabilities?
Scott Bray: (01:03:20)
We’d save that for the closed session.
Raja Krishnamoorthi: (01:03:22)
Okay, great. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman: (01:03:25)
Mr. LaHood.
Darin LaHood: (01:03:28)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and want to thank the witnesses for being here
today. Obviously, this topic of UAPs has attracted a lot of interest in
people that are curious about this hearing today. As we talk about, and I
would say there’s a lot of what I would call amateur interest groups
that are involved in the UAP field, my question is when there are
unsubstantiated claims or manufactured claims of UAPs or kind of false
information that’s put out there, what are the consequences for people
that are involved with that or groups that are involved with that?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:04:14)
So one of the concerns that we have is that there are a lot of
individuals and groups that are putting information out there that could
be considered to be somewhat self-serving. We’re trying to do what’s in
the best interest of one, the Department of Defense, and then two,
what’s in the best interest of the public to ensure that we can put
factual-based information back into the mainstream and back into the
bloodstream of the reporting media that we have so people understand
what’s there.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:04:49)
It’s important because we are attempting as this hearing as has drawn
out to understand one, what may just be natural phenomenon, two, what
may be sensor phenomenology or things that were happening with sensors,
three, what may be legitimate counterintelligence threats to places that
we have or bases or installations, or security threats to our
platforms. And anything that diverts us off of what we have with the
resources that have been allocated to us, send us off in these spurious
chases and hunts that are just not helpful. And they also help, well,
they also contribute to the undermining of the confidence that the
Congress and the American people have that we are trying to get to the
root cause of what’s happening here and report on that, and then feed
that back into our national security apparatus so we are able to protect
the American people and our allies. So it is harmful. It is hurtful,
but hopefully, if we get more information out there, we’ll start to
lessen the impact of some of those spurious reports.
Darin LaHood: (01:05:52)
So just taking that a step further, so that misinformation, false
narratives, manufactured, so what are the consequences? Are there legal
consequences? Are there examples that you can give us where people have
been-
Mr. LaHood: (01:06:03)
Are there legal consequences? Are there examples that you can give us,
where people have been held accountable by this information or
disinformation?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:06:07)
I can’t give you any examples where somebody’s been legally held liable for putting something out there, but-
Mr. LaHood: (01:06:15)
Well, I guess what’s the deterrent from people engaging in this activity?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:06:20)
I don’t know. I don’t have that answer. That’s something that you’re
welcome to dialogue with Congress, to talk about that with the members
who help legislate those laws, to say what should be the legal
ramifications that we could use to potentially hold individuals
accountable, whether it be citizens or information that might be
injected into our media by other forces or other countries, if you will.
Mr. LaHood: (01:06:48)
In terms of DOD’s review and analysis in this field, is there a standard
in place when it comes to UAPs? Is there any guidance you look to
that’s codified in law or otherwise within DOD, that kind of sets out
the standards for UAPs, and what to look for?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:07:05)
I think that’s part of what the group that we’re standing up know will
be chartered to do. From my organization, we’ll be looking at policies
and standards that we have to come to you and work with you to actually
put in place, and promulgate across our government.
Mr. LaHood: (01:07:22)
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Carson: (01:07:24)
The gentleman yields back. Mr. Welch?
Mr. Welch: (01:07:27)
Thank you. I’m going to follow on the line of questions from Mr. LaHood.
Chairman, what seems incredibly difficult for you is that there’s two
almost competing but different narratives. One is no one knows whether
there’s extraterrestrial life. It’s a big universe, and it would be
pretty presumptuous to have a hard and fast conclusion, and then if
there is, it’s not beyond the realm of possibility that there is some
exploration coming here, and that underlies a lot of the reports you
get. I think Mr. LaHood was asking about that, people think there must
extraterrestrial life, and it’s not at all beyond the pale that there
would be a visit here.
Mr. Welch: (01:08:10)
On the other hand, as the DOD, you have the responsibility to make sure
that our national security is protected, and that if there are
surveillance drones or active drones that can disable our systems, that
has to be analyzed. It has to be stopped. How do you divide these? How
do you separate your responsibilities, where you get all these reports
from folks who may be in good faith, may be not, believe that you should
be investigating every possible report of a extraterrestrial incident?
I’ll start with you, Mr. Moultrie.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:08:52)
Sure, indeed, Congressman, and thank you for the question. It’s
important that we, as a part of this effort, really build out the
relationship that we have with others, including NASA, and for the
reasons that you just pointed out. There are elements in our government
that are engaged in looking for life in other places, and they have been
doing that for decades. They’ve been searching for extraterrestrial
life. There are astrobiologists who have been doing this too.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:09:24)
We are part of that same government, and so our goal is not to
potentially cover up something, if we were to find something. It’s to
understand what may be out there, examine what it may mean for us, if
there are any, from a defense perspective, any national security
implications or ramifications, but then to work with organizations as
appropriate. If it’s a weather phenomenology, with NOAA. If it’s a
potential for extraterrestrial life, or an indication of
extraterrestrial life, with someone like NASA.
Mr. Welch: (01:09:58)
The transparency actually is very important.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:10:01)
Completely.
Mr. Welch: (01:10:01)
For public consumption.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:10:03)
Completely.
Mr. Welch: (01:10:04)
We’re going to have a classified briefing. Without going into the
details of what kinds of secrets that we can’t share here, what is it …
What are we protecting? I don’t know if you can answer this question in
this open forum, but in fact, your perception of what it is we have to
quote, “Protect.”
Ronald Moultrie: (01:10:30)
I think right now what’s really important for us to protect is how we
know certain things. There are a lot of things that we know, whether it
be about the thinking of other leaders around the world, the weapons
systems that are being developed, or how we detect things that may be
threats to us. Many of those things are the result of some of our most
sensitive sources and methods. We’ll use those things, not just for this
effort, but those same sources and methods are used to help protect us
from adversaries and from others who might mean to do us harm. There
aren’t separate UAP censors. There’s not a separate UAP processing
computer. There’s not a separate UAP dissemination train or whatever, so
it’s the same processes. It’s the same system that we have that helps
us do all that.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:11:13)
We need to protect that, because this is something that we’re looking
at, but we’re sure there are going to be other things that we’ll look at
in the future, that will need those same censors, that will need those
same sources and methods to help us do … So we’re protecting the fact
that this nation has developed capabilities that enable us to know what
may be threats to us, and to counter those threats before they become
something of a national issue.
Mr. Welch: (01:11:39)
Thank you very much. I want to thank both you, Mr. Bray, and you Mr. Moultrie, for your appearance today. I yield back.
Mr. Carson: (01:11:45)
The gentleman yields back. Gentlemen, beyond videos, is there a range of
other information that the executive branch has that would be valuable
to the American people, while protecting sources and methods, obviously?
The details of individual encounters, including the time, place, and
details of an encounter, and does the AOIMSG have a clear and repeatable
process for considering public release as part of the process?
Scott Bray: (01:12:17)
Congressman, the-
Mr. Carson: (01:12:18)
And do you commit to building that process, if it’s not in place?
Scott Bray: (01:12:20)
The UAP Taskforce, the Security Classification Guide that the UAP
Taskforce has been operating under that I approved really was meant to
protect those sources and methods, and meant to protect any knowledge
that an adversary, intelligence entity may gain, from understanding what
we’re tracking, how we track it, or when we’re tracking it, or if we’re
not. That has been an important piece in the balance between
transparency and preserving our war fighting advantage, because the U.S.
military does train as it would fight. What I will commit to is, at
least for that material that’s under my authority as the Deputy Director
of Naval Intelligence, for information that we have, when it does not
involve sources and methods, and when we can, with a reasonable degree
of confidence, determine that it does not pose a foreign intelligence or
national security threat, and it’s within my authority to do so, I
commit to declassifying that. I believe very much in the transparency of
this, and we work very hard to balance that with our national security
needs.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:13:35)
I’ll just add, Congressman, just over the last three, four months, I
think that the intelligence community and the national defense apparatus
have disclosed more information on various events than it has in
probably the previous 10 years. You have our commitment to work closely
with the Director of National Intelligence and others, in the
declassification and downgrading of intel apparatus, to ensure that we
can get whatever information that we can out to the American people and
to the public at large.
Mr. Carson: (01:14:10)
Greatly appreciated, sir. Ranking Member, Crawford.
Mr. Crawford: (01:14:12)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Representative Stefanik is in route, I believe,
just real quickly, but in the interim if I could, if you’ll indulge me,
I just have a couple of real small questions. One is do we have an
example … Can you provide us a specific example of an object that can’t
be explained as having been human made or natural?
Scott Bray: (01:14:36)
I mean the example that I would say is still unresolved, that I think
everyone understands quite well is the 2004 incident from Nimitz. We
have data on that, and it simply remains unresolved. It does not mean it
resolves to being something that is easily explainable or difficult …
Well, obviously it resolves as being something that is difficult to
explain, but I can’t point to something that definitively was not
manmade, but I can point to a number of examples and which remain
unresolved.
Mr. Crawford: (01:15:11)
Got you. With regard to videos that have appeared in open source
channels, for example the TikTok video, does AOIMSG maintain control of
videos, and how do you prevent leaks of potentially classified videos or
other material?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:15:26)
The AOIMSG, as we establish that organization, we will have a process
for classified and compartmented holdings, and we will find a way of
getting positive control over those. We have our sensitive access
programs and special access programs that allow us to put what we call
SAPs around things, and then there’s controlled access programs that
allow us to put caps around things. We’ll have that in place.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:15:51)
Our goal will be ensuring that we’re sharing that with the appropriate
analysts and the appropriate exploiters, if you will, who can look at
that data too. What we don’t want to do is bring something into a DOD
database or a DOD holding, and then have so many wrappings around it,
it’s not available to those who really need to look at it and to exploit
it. That’s one of the reasons that we’re establishing relationships
with the inter-agency, with the IC, and others who will be able to do
that, sir. But we will do our best to maintain positive control over the
materials that we have within our holdings.
Mr. Crawford: (01:16:20)
Thank you.
Mr. Carson: (01:16:22)
Chairman Schiff.
Adam Schiff: (01:16:25)
Thank you, Chairman. Just going back to the 2021 report, under the
category of UAP appear to demonstrate advanced technology, those 18
incidents in which some of the UAP appeared to remain stationery, winds
aloft, move against the wind, maneuver abruptly, or move at considerable
speed without discernible means of propulsion. It goes on to say, “In a
small number of cases, military aircraft systems processed radio
frequency energy associated with UAP sightings.” I couldn’t tell from
that whether that small number of cases was a part of the subset of 18,
that is among the 18 which appeared to move with unusual pattern or
flight characteristics. Did some of those also emit radio frequency
energy?
Scott Bray: (01:17:21)
I would have to check with our UAP Taskforce on that. I believe, without
getting into specifics that we can do in the closed session, at least
some that we have detected RF emissions from, were not behaving oddly
otherwise.
Adam Schiff: (01:17:40)
And the significance of measuring that radio frequency energy, is what?
That we suspect that this was some form of aircraft in which there were
radio transmissions?
Scott Bray: (01:17:54)
The biggest thing that you’re looking for there is any indication of an
effort to jam whatever censors that we may have looking at it.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:18:01)
But I would also add to that, that radio frequency, as you know,
Congressman, is used to control various platforms too. The fact of
emanations coming off of any platform, whether it be a UAV, or another
platform, could be radio frequency activity related to that entity
transmitting out or something transmitting to that platform. Of course,
we have a sensitivity with our airborne platforms, of picking it up,
which is one of the reasons that we try to prevent people from using
their cellphones on airplanes and things like that. It’s very sensitive
to our RF emanations.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:18:40)
That’s a part of what we’ll be looking at in the AOIMSG, what is this?
Is this something that we can collect on, and can we start to
characterize the signaling environment around the emanations that may be
coming off of some of these UAPs?
Adam Schiff: (01:18:53)
That energy then that was recorded could be either an effort to jam or
it could be an effort to control a UAV, or any other communication with
that craft?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:19:08)
I would say that’s accurate.
Adam Schiff: (01:19:10)
Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carson: (01:19:12)
Thank you, Chairman. As the ODNI report makes clear, one possible
explanation for UAPs is that we are detecting U.S. aircraft, either
secret air programs or even test prototypes. I won’t ask you in this
setting, obviously, to describe any secret DOD programs. That said, I do
want to make sure the U.S. government isn’t chasing its own tail.
Firstly, do you have a clear and repeatable process to check with
compartmented programs about whether a UAP sighting is attributable to a
U.S. aircraft? Secondly, does the AOIMSG staff have the clearances and
read-ons that they need to investigate all of these incidents? Thirdly,
when your staff cannot be read-on, are your questions to those who are
read-on even being answered?
Ronald Moultrie: (01:20:10)
Well, I’ll start, and then I’ll pass that to Mr. Bray. We’re very
conscious of the potential blue on blue issue, or U.S. on U.S., and so
we’ve established relationships with organizations and entities that are
potentially flying or developing platforms for their own interests, if
you will. Our goal is to continue, and we have a repeatable process. I
think we’ve had that process for some time, to deconflict activities
that we may have, to ensure that we are not potentially reporting on
something that may be a developmental platform or a U.S. operational
platform that is performing either testing or performing a mission.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:20:53)
We will have that in place. We’ve already had those discussions with
organizations and entities. We want to ensure that we’re protecting
their equities. We want to ensure that we’re protecting their sources
and methods, while also getting at what we have here. We want to be able
to deconflict those.
Scott Bray: (01:21:10)
Absolutely. The UAP Taskforce had a process in place to work with other
elements of the Department of Defense and other elements of the
government, to ensure that there’s a as simple a way as possible to
deconflict those. When we reference that in the report, I should say
that we were simply accounting for the fact that there could possibly be
one or two data points that had leaked through, but we were quite
confident that was not the explanation.
Mr. Carson: (01:21:41)
How are you liaising with Space Command? Specifically, how are you
partnering with the parts of the U.S. based command responsible for
space domain awareness? How, if at all, are you partnering with the
Space Force to analyze UAPs?
Scott Bray: (01:22:04)
The UAP Taskforce has a very good relationship with Space Force, as it
does with the rest of the Department of Defense. We have pulled analysts
in from Space Force, to ensure that we’re availing ourselves of that
expertise, as well as any other material they may have that may be
helpful.
Ronald Moultrie: (01:22:26)
Congressman, as you know, Space Force and Space Command, they have
responsibility for space domain awareness. So what we’ve done, we’ve
coordinated with Space Force, we’ve coordinated with their J2, and she
is onboard, in terms of helping us plug into what they have, and for us
to have this interactive exchange of information and data. We’re doing
that with all the services, not just with Space Force or Space Command.
Mr. Carson: (01:22:51)
Thank you, sir. Ranking Member, any additional questions? All right,
Chairman Schiff? All right, with that, I want to thank you all for
taking the time out. I also want to thank my colleagues on both sides of
the aisle for participating in this very historical and important
hearing. I think it’s one of the few times we can demonstrate some
degree of bipartisanship around UAPs and UFOs, so I love it. I
appreciate it. Thank you. We will see you all … We will recess this
hearing for the moment, and return in the closed session at noon.
.jpeg)
